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NFL’S LITIGATION SKATES ONTO THE ICE 
 




This article addresses the insurance implications of the pending concussion 
litigation between the National Hockey League and its current and former 
players.  The author draws comparisons to similar litigation brought 
against the National Football League and the NFL's interactions with its 
insurers to forecast the obstacles the parties in the NHL litigation will face 
in establishing coverage by the many insurance carriers who have insured 
the NHL over time.  The author identifies obstacles including determining 
the moment when coverage is “triggered” and whether certain actions by 
the NHL will preclude coverage and relieve the insurers of their duty to 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Days before the National Football League (“NFL”) kicked off its 
2013 season, it took strides toward resolving the biggest legal threat in its 
ninety-four year history: concussion litigation.  The NFL made a 
preliminary settlement with approximately 4,500 former players and agreed 
to pay $765 million.1 In the settlement, the NFL included a specific 
provision explaining that the settlement “cannot be considered an 
admission by the NFL of liability, or an admission that plaintiffs’ injuries 
were caused by football.”2 While many assumed that this settlement would 
be accepted, the judge handling this litigation denied preliminary approval 
                                                                                                                 
* University of Connecticut School of Law, Juris Doctor Candidate, 2014. I 
would like to thank Professor Patricia McCoy for her invaluable assistance in 
writing this Note through multiple drafts. I would also like to thank my mother and 
best friend, Leona Chodosh, for her unwavering support and for inspiring me to 
always chase my dreams. 
1 Arthur L. Caplan & Lee H. Igel, What’s Unsettled About the NFL 
Concussions Settlement, FORBES.COM (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/leeigel/2013/08/30/whats-unsettled-about-the-nfl-concussions-settlement/. 
2 Mark Fainaru-Wada, et al., NFL, Players Reach Concussion Deal, 
ESPN.COM, (Aug. 29, 2013), http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/9612138/judge-nfl-
players-settle-concussion-suit. 
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of the settlement.3 In the coming months, the NFL will likely try to 
restructure this settlement, or at a minimum, prove that it is fair through 
appropriate documentation in order to put this case behind it.  
The settlement will be historic, as it will change all contact sport 
organizations and how they approach concussions, but its likely settlement 
is a bit unsettling, as it will allow the NFL to avoid answering numerous 
questions that could have resulted in a multi-billion dollar case.4 
Despite the NFL concussion litigation settlement being imminent, 
the NFL’s insurers’ responsibility for paying for this settlement is still 
uncertain.5 The insurers’ duty to indemnify is unlikely to be triggered 
because there is evidence that the NFL committed intentional torts that 
would be excluded from coverage.  Conversely, the insurers’ duty to 
defend seems more definite and it is likely that under the NFL’s current 
Comprehensive General Liability (“CGL”) policies, the NFL’s insurers’ 
duty to defend will be triggered through the settlement process thus far and 
through trial if the settlement negotiations are unsuccessful.  While it 
appears that, eventually, this litigation will be resolved in a settlement, 
some players may still choose to opt out of the settlement if one is 
reached.6 
As the NFL’s insurers’ duty to defend would likely be triggered, 
these insurers should take a closer look at their policies moving forward.  
However, the NFL’s insurers are not the only ones who should be 
evaluating their policies for potential exposure.  In fact, all insurers of 
contact sports in the United States must evaluate the policies they are 
offering to their contact sport insureds in this concussion era.  This includes 
the National Hockey League (“NHL” or the “League”) who, mere months 
                                                                                                                 
3 Mem., In Re: Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., No. 
2:12-md-02323-AB (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2014) at 10. 
4 See Rick Maese & Cindy Boren, NFL, Former Players Settle Concussion 
Lawsuits, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-
08-29/sports/41578247_1_former-players-nfl-players-association-nfl-retirees. 
5 Sheena Harrison, NFL Settles Concussion Claims, but Insurers’ Role in 
Paying Costs Still Unclear, Bus. Ins., (Sept. 8, 2013), 
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20130908/NEWS06/130909875. 
6 See, e.g., Steve Fainaru & Mark Fainaru-Wada, Lawyer Blasts Concussion 
Agreement, ESPN.COM (Jan. 14, 2014), 
http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/10295307/attorney-blasts-concussion-deal-
recommend-clients-continue-sue-nfl (Some of the players’ lawyers have suggested 
that even if the NFL concussion litigation does eventually settle, certain players 
will choose to opt out of the settlement agreement and continue to sue the NFL.).     
2014                NFL’S LITIGATION SKATES ONTO THE ICE            637 
 
  
after the NFL and its players reached a preliminary settlement, are now 
facing similar concussion litigation.7 In the NHL, a similar class action 
lawsuit currently consisting of ten former players “seek[ing] to represent a 
class of more than 10,000 retired NHL players”8 is alleging, among other 
claims, fraudulent misrepresentation by concealment, fraudulent 
misrepresentation by nondisclosure, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and 
negligence.9 These types of large, player-led, class action lawsuits will 
undoubtedly change the face of contact sports forever and will require 
insurers to decide if they should change the policies they offer to their 
contact sport insureds or insure them at all. 
As some concussion litigation may proceed in the NFL, and as the 
NHL has its own upcoming litigation, both of these organizations will 
likely turn to their insurers to defend and indemnify them.  This Note 
focuses on the numerous insurance issues that will be addressed in both 
class actions by examining the progress made thus far in both cases.  More 
specifically, this Note discusses these insurance issues by examining some 
of the arguments that the NFL’s insurers did advance,10 which the NHL’s 
insurers may also advance, to potentially limit or nullify their liability to 
the leagues.  Additionally, this Note evaluates the likelihood that if 
concussion litigation does proceed to trial, courts will implement a 
continuous trigger theory to decide when the insured’s policies are 
triggered.  Due to the resulting potential liability of such a theory, insurers 
have an even stronger incentive to alter their policies going forward to 
avoid future exposure for millions of dollars to current and former injured 
players. 
Parts I and II discuss the medical background of concussions and 
the general history of the NFL concussion litigation.  Part III examines the 
arguments that were left unanswered in the NFL concussion litigation and 
how they are likely to unfold in the NHL concussion litigation. 
Part IV concludes that a continuous trigger theory would likely be 
used to determine insurance coverage in circumstances such as the 
                                                                                                                 
7 See, e.g., Paul D. Anderson, Concussion Litigation Strikes the NHL, NFL 
CONCUSSION LITIG. (Nov. 26, 2013), http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/ ?p=1542. 
8 Id. 
9 See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, Leeman, Aitken, et. al. v. Nat’l Hockey 
League & NHL Bd. of Governors, No. 1:13-cv-01856 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2013) at 
36-46. 
10 Paul D. Anderson, NFL’s Insurer Balks at Concussion Defense, NFL 
CONCUSSION LITIG. (Sept. 16, 2012), http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/?p=1026. 
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concussion litigation presenting latent harm.  Specifically, there are three 
competing theories about what triggers coverage for concussion injuries: 
the initial exposure trigger theory, the manifestation trigger theory, and the 
continuous trigger theory.  This Part argues that a CGL policy is triggered 
at the point of exposure to a mild traumatic brain injury (“MTBI”) through 
the time when a players’ neurological disease manifests itself.  
Accordingly, using either the point of exposure or the point of 
manifestation alone to trigger insurance policies would not align with the 
reasonable expectations of the insured, as the injury does not occur at either 
of these discrete moments.  Moreover, because it is extremely difficult to 
determine exactly when the players’ MTBIs occurred, the manifestation 
trigger theory and the initial exposure trigger theory would be too difficult 
to implement.  In cases presenting this type of latent harm, a continuous 
trigger would be the best approach to determine when an insurance policy 
is triggered, considering this difficulty of ascertaining when the players’ 
injuries “occurred.”  As such, insurers should address this in their policies, 
and some insurers may choose to do so by adding concussion exclusions or 
providing a definition for “trigger” in the event of a concussion. 
Part V considers that the insurers will likely argue that the League 
intended or expected the injuries that the players suffered, which may 
exclude these injuries from coverage.  Finally, Part VI explains that there is 
a strong likelihood that the insurers will be required to defend the League 
under their current insurance policies despite the fact that the players’ 
claims may potentially not be covered. 
 
II. MEDICAL BACKGROUND 
The NFL concussion litigation greatly heightened concern for 
concussions in not only the NFL, but in all contact sports.  For this reason, 
it is likely that sports’ medical personnel nationwide will focus more on the 
causes and diagnoses of concussions for the foreseeable future.  The 
American Association of Neurological Surgeons (“AANS”) defines a 
concussion as an “injury to the brain that results in temporary loss of 
normal brain function, [which is typically] caused by a blow to the head.”11 
                                                                                                                 
11 See Concussion, AM. ASSOC. OF NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS (Dec. 2011), 
http://www.aans.org/Patient%20Information/Conditions%20and%20Treatments/C
oncussion.aspx (explaining that neurosurgeons and other brain-injury experts 
emphasize that although “some concussions are less serious than others, there is no 
such thing as a ‘minor concussion’”). 
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The AANS notes that concussions are serious injuries and cautions that 
“[e]ven mild concussions should not be taken lightly.”12 When concussions 
are ignored or otherwise improperly treated prior to a player reentering a 
game or practice, that player is more likely to suffer another concussion.13 
This is especially troubling because sources suggest that the harm caused 
by concussions has a cumulative effect and can result in 
neuropsychological impairment and neurologic abnormalities.14 This link 
between concussions and neurologic abnormalities and diseases has been 
illustrated by numerous players’ stories.15 In fact, in 2012, researchers 
announced that thirty-four NFL players “whose brains were studied 
suffered from chronic traumatic encephalopathy (“CTE”), a degenerative 
brain disease brought on by repeated hits to the head that results in 
confusion, depression and, eventually, dementia.”16 
CTE has also been discovered in former hockey players’ brains.17 
For instance, in 2011 the brain of Derek Boogaard, a twenty-eight-year-old 
hockey player, was studied after he died from what was ruled an accidental 
                                                                                                                 
12 Id. 
13 Michael W. Collins & Kristen L. Hawn, The Clinical Management of Sports 
Concussion, 1 CURRENT SPORTS MED. REPORTS 12, 12 (2002).  
14 Id. See AM. ASSOC. OF NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS, supra note 11 
(cautioning that one concussion soon after another “does not have to be very strong 
for its effects to be deadly or permanently disabling”). 
15 See, e.g., Sydney Lupkin, CTE, a Degenerative Brain Disease, Found in 34 
Pro Football Players, ABC NEWS (Dec. 3, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/ 
Health/cte-degenerative-brain-disease-found-34-pro-football/story?id=17869457 
(“Researchers at Boston University's Center for the Study of Traumatic 
Encephalopathy published the largest case series study of CTE to date, according 
to the center. Of the 85 brains donated by the families of deceased veterans and 
athletes with histories of repeated head trauma, they found CTE in [sixty-eight] of 
them. Of those, [thirty-four] were professional football players, nine others played 
college football and six played only high school football.” Additionally, several 
NFL players have committed suicide in recent years whose brains contained CTE 
including former Kansas City Chiefs player Jovan Belcher, former NFL players 
Junior Seau, Dave Duerson, former Pittsburgh Steelers player Terry Long, and 
former Philadelphia Eagles player Andre Waters.). 
16 Id. 
17 See John Branch, Derek Boogaard: A Brain ‘Going Bad,’ N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/06/sports/hockey/derek-boogaard-a-
brain-going-bad.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1. (In the preceding two years, CTE was 
also discovered in the brains of two other former NHL players, Reggie Fleming 
and Rick Martin.). 
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overdose.18 The neuropathologist at the Boston University’s Center for the 
Study of Traumatic Encephalopathy, who has examined nearly eighty 
brains of former athletes, was shocked by how advanced the degree of 
brain damage was in such a young player.19 A few months after Boogaard’s 
death, two more young NHL players were found dead: Rick Rypien, a 
twenty-seven-year-old player who committed suicide, and Wade Belak, a 
twenty-seven-year-old player who reportedly hanged himself.20 At the time 
of this writing, it appears that neither player’s brain was studied for CTE.21 
 
A. NFL LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT 
As more news surfaced of past contact sports players who 
committed suicide and had CTE in their brains, numerous NFL players 
took a historic step and brought a class action lawsuit against the NFL.  In 
August 2011, the first professional football players filed lawsuits against 
the NFL alleging more than ten counts, including fraudulent concealment, 
fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and negligence.22 The players’ claims 
centered around the premise that the NFL did know, or at least should have 
known, about the potentially serious implications of sustaining concussions 
and not only failed to inform players, but also intentionally hid this 
information from them.23 If these lawsuits proceed to court, the players 
would face numerous obstacles.  Obstacles include possible dismissal due 
to arbitration clauses in the collective bargaining agreements that they 
entered into with the League,24 difficulty proving that their injuries 




21 See, e.g., Pat Hauldren, NHL Enforcers Deadly and Dying, EXAMINER.COM 
(Sept. 2, 2011) http://www.examiner.com/article/nhl-enforcers-deadly-and-dying. 
22 See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Amended Master Admin. Long-Form Complaint, In Re: 
Nat’l Football, No. 2:12-md-02323-AB (E.D. Pa. Jul. 17, 2012). 
23 See generally id. at 15-44. 
24 The League argued that the players’ claims were preempted by the 
arbitration clauses in the players’ collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs”), 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, In Re: Nat’l Football, at 6, 7, 15. No. 2:12-md-
02323-AB (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2012), and up until the settlement made little effort 
to set forth arguments countering the players’ claims due to this CBA argument.  
See id. at 14-34. The validity of this preemption argument would have been crucial 
had the case not settled because if all of these claims were preempted by the CBAs 
the players will be forced to pursue their case through the “agreed-to arbitration 
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occurred while playing professional football in the NFL,25 and difficulty 
proving that they did not expect their injuries.26 
In a proactive response, many of the NFL’s insurers filed motions 
for declaratory judgment in which they asked a court to determine whether 
they had a duty to defend and/or indemnify the NFL.  For example, Alterra 
America Insurance Company (“Alterra”), one of the NFL’s insurers, filed a 
complaint seeking a declaration of relief with respect to both its duty to 
defend and its duty to indemnify the NFL against ninety-three different 
lawsuits brought by former players.27 Alterra contended that since the 
underlying claims filed by the players alleged that the NFL acted 
                                                                                                                 
procedures” in the CBAs.  Paul D. Anderson, The Almighty CBA, NFL 
CONCUSSION LITIG. (Aug. 30, 2012), http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/ ?p=1080.  
This defense will also be available to the NHL in its upcoming class action. 
Anderson, supra note 7. 
25 Due to the pressure that players feel, fewer concussions are reported because 
players try to exude toughness and feign feeling healthy. Michael Farber, The 
Worst Case, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Dec. 19, 1994), 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1006087/index/index/
htm. While many players deny having symptoms when playing, the plaintiffs still 
blamed the NFL for these attitudes and alleged that the NFL promotes football by 
glorifying the brutality of the sport and representing that “putting big hits on others 
is a badge of courage and does not seriously threaten one’s health.” Plaintiff’s 
Amended Complaint, supra note 22, at 11. The plaintiffs’ complaint further asserts 
that the League professed to its players that collisions, regardless of the injuries 
they lead to, are a normal consequence of football and “a measure of the courage 
and heroism of players.”  Id. Due to these factors, it can certainly be argued that 
players intended and/or expected these injuries. 
26 Players would have trouble arguing that they did not intend and/or expect 
their injuries when players such as Al Toon, a former wide receiver for the New 
York Jets, who retired from football at age twenty-nine after sustaining his ninth 
diagnosed concussion stated that “[he] chose the profession and [he] understood 
the perils of the profession when [he] was playing.” William C. Rhoden, Two Ex-
Jets Have Moved On, but Concussion Effects Linger, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/21/sports/football/concussion-effects-linger-for-
two-ex-jets.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. See also Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, 
supra note 22, at 13 (Ernest Givens stated, “I get knocked out a lot, I get 
concussions, I get broken noses, that is part of being a receiver, that’s what 
separates you from being a typical receiver than a great receiver.”)  
27 Alterra Balks at Defending NFL in Concussion Suits, INSURANCE 
JOURNAL.COM (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/east/ 
2012/08/16/259710.htm.  
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fraudulently, it should not be required to defend the League against the 
players’ lawsuits.28 Soon after Alterra filed its motion for declaratory relief, 
other insurers, including Travelers and Allstate, filed similar pleadings.29 
Allstate also sought declaratory relief in relation to any alleged duty to 
indemnify, claiming that “any past or future duty to indemnify the NFL 
Defendants may be limited or precluded by a number of factual or legal 
defenses.”30 
After these insurers filed declaratory relief motions in New York, 
the NFL brought a declaratory relief action in Los Angeles Superior Court 
regarding the coverage duties of thirty-two insurance carriers pursuant to 
187 commercial liability policies that were issued over a fifty to sixty year 
period.31 The NFL then moved to dismiss the New York lawsuits, which 
the defendant insurers argued against on forum non conveniens grounds.32 
The Los Angeles Superior Court ordered the California proceeding stayed 
pending the outcome of the New York actions and, despite the NFL’s 
appeal, this decision was affirmed.33 As such, the declaratory relief motions 
are ripe for decision in the Supreme Court of New York. 
                                                                                                                 
28 Id. 
29 Consolidated Reply of Defendants Nat’l Football League and NFL Props., 
LLC in Support of Motions to Dismiss Claims of TIG Insurers, Travelers Insurers, 
and Allstate, Discover Prop. & Cas. Co., et al. v. Nat’l Football League, et al., No. 
652933/2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 2, 2012) at 2. Discover Property & Casualty 
Insurance Company has filed a motion to dismiss or stay on forum non conveniens 
grounds suggesting that California is an inconvenient and improper forum.  See id. 
at 1.  
30 Answer of Defendant Allstate Ins. Co. and Crossclaim for Declaratory 
Judgment against Defendants Nat’l Football League and Nat’l Football League 
Props., LLC, Discover Prop. & Cas. Co., et al. v. National Football League, et al., 
14, No. 652933/2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 28, 2012).  In its cross claim, Allstate 
alleges twenty-five factors that may limit or preclude its duty to indemnify 
including that Allstate’s policies do not provide coverage for claims that arise from 
conduct that is in violation of the law or public policy, the policies do not cover 
bodily injury which did not take place during the policy period, and the excess 
insurance policy does not provide coverage for any bodily injury or damage that 
was expected or intended.  See id. at 14-15. 
31 Nat’l Football League et al., v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. et al., No. B245619, 
216 Cal. App. 4th 902, 908 (Cal. Ct. App. May 28, 2013). 
32  See Consolidated Reply of Defendants, supra note 29, at 25-26; Discover 
Prop. & Cas. Co. et al., supra note 29. 
33 Mem. of Law of Defendants Nat’l Football League and NFL Props. LLC in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss or Stay Discover Complaint and Counterclaims and 
 
2014                NFL’S LITIGATION SKATES ONTO THE ICE            643 
 
  
As Allstate’s cross-claim illustrates, the insurers’ claims are 
predicated on the merits of the underlying case between the NFL and its 
players.34 At the time of this writing, these declaratory relief motions have 
yet to be decided.  However, due to the fact that the court would be 
required to analyze the underlying claims of the players’ lawsuit against the 
NFL in order to decide these motions, the Supreme Court of New York 
should refrain from granting the insurers’ request for declaratory relief in 
order to allow the issues to be decided by the proper fact-finders, the jury.  
If the courts do deny the insurers’ motions for declaratory relief, the 
insurers would likely be required to defend the NFL.  Nevertheless, if this 
case settles and no players choose to opt out of the settlement, these 
motions become wholly irrelevant. 
While there is a strong likelihood that the insurers would have a 
duty to defend, it is just as likely that they would not be required to 
indemnify the NFL.  The NFL’s insurers possess several potential 
arguments that can nullify their duty to indemnify the NFL.  In the event 
that this case proceeds to trial or players choose to opt out of a settlement 
and continue to sue the NFL, the NFL’s insurers could argue that the NFL 
intended and/or expected these injuries.  The NFL conducted studies of 
concussions in professional football spanning from 1994 to 2005, 
examining periods during the 1990s and 2000s.35 One of the most 
significant NFL studies was conducted in 199436 and was set in motion by 
then Commissioner of Football, Paul Tagliabue, who formed the Mild 
Traumatic Brain Injury Committee (“Committee”).37 The Committee’s goal 
was to study concussions (also referred to as mild traumatic brain injuries 
                                                                                                                 
Cross-Claims of TIG Insurers and Allstate at 11-12, Discover Prop. & Cas. Co. et 
al. v. Nat’l Football League et al., No. 652933/2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 17, 2012). 
34 Allstate is claiming it does not owe a duty to defend based on the potential 
of intended and/or expected injury and arguments that injuries did not occur within 
the policy period which would go to the heart of the trigger issues of the 
underlying case. See Answer of Defendant Allstate Ins. Co., supra note 30, at 15. 
35 See, e.g., Nathan Fenno & Luke Rosiak, NFL Concussion Lawsuits, WASH. 
TIMES (July 19, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/football injuries/. 
36 The concussion problem was a rampant issue as early as 1994.  In that year, 
data supplied by twenty-eight NFL teams demonstrated that from 1989 to 1993, 
341 players on the twenty-eight teams in the League had suffered from 445 
concussions. Farber, supra note 25. This equated to about two and a half 
concussions for every 1,000 plays.  Id. 
37 Paul Anderson, A New Era of Pro Football, NFL CONCUSSION LITIG. (Oct. 
17, 2012), http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/?p=1194.  
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or MTBIs), in professional football and to determine their potential long-
term effects.38 
After fifteen years, the Committee released several studies that are 
now all considered extremely controversial.39 One of these studies, 
“Concussion in Professional Football: Summary of the Research 
Conducted by the National Football League’s Committee of Mild 
Traumatic Brain Injury,” refuted the link between concussions and 
neurodegenerative diseases.40 The study noted that “arbitrary return-to-play 
guidelines may be too conservative for professional football . . . [and] many 
NFL players can safely be allowed to return to play on the day of the injury 
after sustaining a [M]TBI.”41 
Based on this and other evidence, the insurers could argue, similar 
to what the players alleged in their complaint, that the NFL intentionally 
misled the players about the potential consequences of concussions.  If 
proven, this would bar the NFL from coverage under its CGL policies.  The 
insurers could successfully argue that during the fifteen-year period when 
the Committee was conducting studies, the NFL concealed and/or 
misrepresented the long-term effects of concussions from its players and 
knew that its studies were misleading.42 The argument that the NFL 
concealed information, was explored in the October 2009 and January 2010 
Judiciary hearings before the House of Representatives.  The Committee on 
the Judiciary (the “Judiciary”) held a hearing to determine the severity of 
the concussion problem in football and the potential remedies that were 
available.43 
At these hearings, the NFL was questioned about a pamphlet 
dealing with concussions, which it distributed to its players.  The pamphlet 
stated: 
 
                                                                                                                 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. (discussing Elliot J. Pellman & David C. Viano, Concussion in 
Professional Football: Summary of the Research Conducted by the National 
Football League’s Committee on Mild Traumatic Brain Injury, 21 
NEUROSURGICAL FOCUS (2006)). 
41 Id. 
42 See Plaintiffs’ Amended Master Admin. Long-Form Complaint, supra note 
22, at 33.  
43 See Legal Issues Relating to Football Head Injuries (Pt. I): Hearing Before 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of Rep. John 
Conyers, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
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Question: if I have had more than one concussion, am I at 
increased risks for another injury?  Answer: Current 
research with professional athletes has not shown that 
having more than one or two concussions leads to 
permanent problems if each injury is managed properly.  It 
is important to understand that there is no magic number 
for how many concussions is too many.44 
 
Thus, the NFL was informing its players that there is “no magic number” 
of concussions that makes a player more prone to suffer long-term 
neurological damage at the same time when numerous studies showed a 
link between any blunt force trauma, such as that occurring in football, and 
premature death among athletes.  This type of questionable behavior lends 
support to the players’ allegations that the NFL concealed information from 
them.45 Similarly, during these Judiciary hearings, the NFL Commissioner, 
Roger Goodell, would not unequivocally agree that there was proof of a 
link between concussions and neurodegenerative diseases.46 One Judiciary 
member referred to the League’s denial as a blank rejection and accused 
the League of minimizing the fact that this link existed.47 
If the NFL concussion litigation does not settle, or some players 
opt out of the settlement and continue to sue the NFL, courts would be 
required to analyze these and other defenses to coverage for nearly 200 
CGL policies due to the fact that from 1968 to 2012 the NFL was covered 
by insurance policies issued by thirty-two insurance carriers.48 
Nevertheless, this analysis has yet to occur, as two years after the first 
players filed their lawsuits against the NFL, the NFL entered into a 
preliminary settlement with the players for $765 million.  From this 
settlement amount, $675 million will 
 
                                                                                                                 
44 Id. at 115-16. 
45 See Plaintiffs’ Amended Master Admin. Long-form Complaint, supra note 
22, at 1. 
46 See Legal issues relating to football head injuries. Pt. I, supra note 43, at 
116-18 (2009) (statement of Comm’r of Football, Roger Goodell, H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary). 
47 Id. at 116. (statement of Representative John Conyers, Chairman, H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary) (statement of California Representative Linda T. Sanchez). 
48 Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 216 Cal. App. 4th at 906. 
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[c]ompensate former players and families of deceased 
players who have suffered cognitive injury . . . . Other 
money will be used for baseline medical exams, the cost of 
which will be capped at $75 million.  The NFL also will 
fund research and education at a cost of $10 million . . . . 
The settlement will include all players (whether they were 
part of the suit or not) who have retired as of the date on 
which the court gives preliminary approval . . . .  Current 
players are not eligible.  The NFL has [twenty] years to 
pay the full amount of the settlement, but half of the total 
must be paid within the first three years and the rest over 
the next [seventeen] years.49 
 
According to ESPN, the compensation program is designed to last for up to 
sixty years and will allow retired players who later develop neurological 
diseases or conditions to apply for compensation.50 
While it appeared as though the NFL concussion litigation was 
concluding, the judge handling this litigation denied preliminary approval 
of the settlement, explaining that, “I’m primarily concerned that not 
all Retired NFL Football Players who ultimately receive a Qualifying 
Diagnosis or their related claimants will be paid.”51 This judge commended 
both sides for arriving at this preliminary settlement,52 but explained that 
she was not convinced that the settlement “ha[d] no obvious deficiencies, 
grant[ed] no preferential treatment to segments of the class, and [fell] 
within the range of possible approval.”53 The NFL will likely still arrive at 
a settlement with its players; however, one attorney explained that he 
believes that the current settlement does not adequately compensate many 
of the players and indicated that even if the settlement is approved by the 
judge, many players may “opt out” of the settlement and continue litigation 
against the NFL.54 
                                                                                                                 
49 Fainaru-Wada, supra note 2. 
50 Id. 
51 Mem., In Re: Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 
supra note 3. 
52 Fainaru-Wada, supra note 2.  
53 Mem., In Re: Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 
supra note 3 (citing Cordy v. USS-Posco Indus., No. 12-553, 2013 WL 4028627 at 
*3 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 31, 2013). 
54 Fainaru & Fainaru-Wada, supra note 6. 
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Thus, these settlement discussions and the litigation that may 
follow are only the beginning of the conversation that will take place 
nationwide about concussions in sports.  In fact, in the past three years 
since the initial lawsuits in the NFL concussion litigation were filed, a new 
era of professional football has emerged in which players are informed 
about the risks they face when they step onto the field.55 In this new era, 
players no longer make their own medical determinations as to when they 
obtain a head injury.  Instead, independent neurologists decide when 
concussed players can return to the game.56 This change has not been 
limited to the NFL, however, and this leads to the question: how will the 
numerous issues in the NFL concussion litigation be resolved if this case 
does not settle?  And, how will these questions be answered in the context 
of the NHL concussion litigation?  To evaluate the insurance issues that 
will arise in the NFL concussion litigation if it proceeds and in the NHL 
concussion litigation, this Note will focus on the upcoming NHL 
concussion litigation. 
 
III. INSURANCE CONTRACT BACKGROUND IN NHL 
CONCUSSION LITIGATION 
One type of insurance policy that the NHL has is a CGL policy that 
insures the League for injuries that players sustain as long as those injuries 
are not excluded from coverage.  Although the specific policies sold to the 
NHL by its insurers are not available to the public, the typical CGL 
policy’s terms and provisions will be similar to the clauses of the NHL’s 
CGL insurance policies which the courts will be required to analyze.57 Like 
the NFL did, when the NHL defends the newly formed player-led class 
action, it will likely turn to its insurers for indemnification relying on its 
“insuring clause” within its CGL policy.58 A typical insuring clause 
                                                                                                                 
55 See Anderson, supra note 37. 
56 Id. 
57 The insurance contracts will only be analyzed if these cases are not subject 
to mandatory arbitration. The League will argue that the players’ claims are subject 
to mandatory arbitration pursuant to the players’ collective bargaining agreements. 
See Anderson, supra note 7. 
58 See Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. et al., 216 Cal. App. 4th at 908; Appellants’ 
Brief, Nat’l Football League & NFL Props. LLC, v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., et 
al., 2013 WL 233176 (Cal. App. 2 Dist.) at 1-2 (internal citations omitted) (The 
NFL and NFL Properties filed an action in California against thirty-two general 
liability insurers that issued 187 primary and excess insurance policies to one or 
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provides that the insurer “will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which 
the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of 
bodily injury or property damage to which [the] insurance applies.”59 The 
NHL’s general liability insurers are likely as extensive as the NFL’s 
insurers in number60 and as such, these lawsuits coupled with those on-
going in the NFL, will undoubtedly affect how insurers choose to insure 
any contact sport organization in the future. 
In the NHL, this discussion regarding how to cover the League in 
this concussion era may have already begun in the context of disability 
insurance.  For instance, in 2012, one of the Pittsburgh Penguins’ top 
players, Sidney Crosby, was sidelined for most of the season due to 
concussion-related injuries.61 Since Crosby had been injured and out of the 
lineup for more than thirty games, the Penguins relied on their disability 
insurance policy to cover Crosby’s nine million dollar salary.  Analysts 
have suggested, however, that this “security blanket is poised to 
disappear”62 because insurance companies may cease to insure these 
athletes, forcing teams to take on these million-dollar contracts alone.63 For 
the Penguins, this is especially troubling because if Crosby, who has one 
year remaining on his contract, returns to the ice, he will be in line for a 
new long-term contract for approximately ten million dollars a year.  But if 
no insurance company is willing to insure him against concussions, the 
Penguins may not be able to afford to retain him.64 
The chief executive of one New York-based insurer, HCC 
Specialty, noted that “[r]ight now you’ve got [ten] percent of the [L]eague 
                                                                                                                 
both over a forty-four year period.  “The NFL Policyholders sued twelve primary 
insurers for breach of their duty to defend the NFL Policyholders in underlying tort 
litigation filed by former NFL players, and sued all 32 insurers for a declaratory 
judgment that their policies cover any liability that might be incurred in the tort 
litigation.”) 
59 TODD A. ROSSI & MARK D. MESE, THE REFERENCE HANDBOOK ON THE 
COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY 109 (Alan Rutkin & Robert 
Tugander eds., 2010); See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 358 (2008). 
60 Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. et al., 216 Cal. App. 4th at 906. 
61 See Rick Westhead, Concussions Could Ruin NHL Teams If Insurers Pull 





64 See id. 
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affected by concussions . . . [w]hile I don’t know where the breaking point 
is, at some point, if it keeps trending this way, [insurance] companies are 
not going to be able to insure NHL players for concussions.”65 Another 
insurer, Toronto-based Sutton Special Risk, an insurer for “off-ice 
insurance to more than 400 NHL players,” rewrote its insurance application 
form in order to focus more attention on players’ concussion histories and 
help protect itself from liability for players with past concussions.66 
Due to the vast number of players who have been sidelined with 
concussions in the NHL, there is no question that this is one of the most 
prevalent issues in the League today.  Despite the magnitude of the 
concussion problem in the NHL, the president of Sutton Special Risk 
professed that it is too early to say that the insurance industry will change 
the policies that it offers to NHL players because the industry is still 
evolving.67 With that said, it is likely a matter of time before this discussion 
of limiting or revoking the League’s insurance for players with concussions 
transcends the context of disability insurance to that of general liability 
insurance.  Insurers will need to make difficult decisions to protect 
themselves from this concussion epidemic that will remain at the forefront 
of contact sports for the foreseeable future.  While insurers may decide to 
take steps to limit their liability through modifying the policies that they 
offer to their contact sport insureds, insurers will still stand behind their 
current policies in the upcoming NHL litigation and likely argue that even 
under their current policies they do not have a duty to defend or indemnify 
the League. 
 
                                                                                                                 
65 Id. 
66 See id. (Sutton Special Risk’s president noted, “[w]e used to have one 
question asking players their history with cardiac issues and other problems like 
concussions . . . [n]ow, concussions have their own section. We’re asking about 
frequency, how bad they were and how many games they missed. We know you’re 
not recovered from brain injuries because the symptoms go away. This is not an 
organ like the liver that can regenerate itself.”). 
67 See NHL concussions put player insurance in question, CBC SPORTS (Jan. 
31, 2012), http://www.cbc.ca/sports/hockey/nhl/nhl-concussions-put-player-
insurance-in-question-1.1132073. But see Westhead, supra note 61 (according to 
one player agent, new contracts will contain concussion exclusions, making it 
impossible for teams to insure players with past concussions against future brain 
injuries).  
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A. NHL CONCUSSION LITIGATION 
In the NHL class action complaint, the players are alleging 
numerous counts, including fraudulent misrepresentation by concealment, 
fraudulent misrepresentation by nondisclosure, fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, and negligence.68 The players’ claims rest on the 
growing body of medical evidence linking concussions to long-term injury 
as well as on evidence that the League knew or should have known of those 
medical studies but took no remedial action to prevent injury until 1997.69 
The players note that in 1997 the NHL created a concussion program to 
conduct research about the effects of concussions on players’ brains.  
Despite conducting that research, the players allege that the NHL did 
nothing to actually prevent injury to its players for another fourteen years.70 
Additionally, the players assert that the NHL continues to ignore the 
extensive medical research linking hockey to brain injuries and fosters 
violence in the sport by, among other things, “refusing to ban fighting and 
body checking and by continuing to employ hockey players whose main 
function is to fight or violently body check players on the other team.”71 
Observing that the NHL has an annual gross income of $3.3 billion,72 the 
players argue that the NHL has promoted a culture of violence and 
“purposefully profits from the violence they promote.”73 
The players contend that the NHL did not make any significant 
changes to prevent concussions until 2010 when it made body checking 
with the head a penalty.74 After 2010, the NHL made other noteworthy 
safety changes including requiring a doctor, as opposed to a trainer, to 
examine its players for concussions off the ice and away from the bench75 
and changing its concussion protocols to forbid any concussed player from 
                                                                                                                 
68 See, e.g., Compl., supra note 9, at 36–46. 
69 See id. at  ¶ 7.  
70 See id. at  ¶ 11. 
71 Id. at ¶ 17; see also id. at ¶ 133 (not outlawing fighting and body checks in 
the NHL is significant because “[o]nly [twenty eight percent] of the reported 
concussions in the Cusimano report were the result of a called penalty while 
[approximately sixty four percent] of the total concussions were caused by body 
checking. A legal body check to the other player’s body can still result in the 
checked player’s head hitting the ice, boards or glass, resulting in a concussion.”). 
72 Id. at ¶ 78. 
73 Id. at ¶ 89. 
74 Id. at ¶ 112. 
75 Id. at ¶ 116. 
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returning to the game in which they received the concussion.76 Similar to 
the allegations in the NFL concussion litigation, the NHL players’ overall 
argument is that “[t]he NHL knew that repetitive head impacts in hockey 
games and practices created an unreasonable risk of harm to NHL players77 
. . . [but] withheld [and/or concealed] the information it knew about the 
risks of head injuries in the game from then-current NHL players and 
former NHL players.”78 Moreover, the players allege in their complaint that 
the NHL “deliberately delayed implementing the changes to the game it 
knew could reduce players’ exposure to the risk of life-altering head 
injuries because those changes would be expensive and would reduce its 
profitability.”79 
Overall, the NHL players’ allegations are very similar to those 
made by the NFL players in their class action lawsuit.80 For that reason, it 
is likely the League’s insurers will react in a similar way to how the NFL’s 
insurers have acted thus far.  Yet, even if the NHL and NFL cases both do 
not proceed to trial, these two concussion litigation class action lawsuits 
will motivate insurers to protect themselves from future concussion 
lawsuits.  Hence, regardless of the results of these litigations, insurers must 
confront the fact that under their current CGL policies, they are possibly 
responsible for at least defending, and also potentially indemnifying, their 
insured in the event of a lawsuit based on concussions and related long-
term injuries. 
Due to their likely liability, insurers may take steps to make it clear 
in their policies what the trigger is in the event of a concussion.  If insurers 
do attempt to alter their policies, it is possible that they could face push 
back from individual state insurance regulators, depending on the state.  
However, because the NHL and NFL are both such large entities, it is 
possible they will not be required to obtain permission to alter their CGL 
                                                                                                                 
76 See id. at ¶ 118 (a standard that other countries adopted in 2004). 
77 Id. at ¶ 170. 
78 See id. at ¶¶ 177, 200. 
79 Id. at ¶ 201. 
80 But see Anderson, Concussion Litigation Strikes the NHL, supra note 7 
(“Although the legal theories are similar [between the NFL and NHL concussion 
litigation], the factual allegations in the NHL litigation are far less damning than 
those asserted against NFL. There is no evidence — at least publicly — that shows 
the NHL created (1) a brain injury committee, (2) headed by a rheumatologist and 
(3) spent 15-plus years creating false studies.”).  Additionally, unlike the NFL, the 
NHL was not questioned for their actions in relations to concussions in their league 
by Congress and have not denied that their sport can cause brain damage. Id. 
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policies.  Additionally, insurers must contemplate how their exclusions for 
intended and/or expected injuries may assist them in avoiding 
indemnification and their duty to defend in any continuing litigation. 
 
IV. OPEN QUESTIONS AFTER THE NFL CONCUSSION 
LITIGATION 
A. TRIGGERS AND OCCURRENCES 
 An insurance policy comes into effect or is triggered when a relevant 
condition of the policy has occurred; at that time, the insurers’ obligations 
become due.81 In many insurance cases, the “trigger” of coverage is not at 
issue.82 When the cause or the injury itself does not occur at a discrete 
moment, however, and instead materializes over time, it can be difficult to 
determine what policies were triggered and exactly when they were 
triggered.83 
 The conditions that trigger an insurance policy are called 
occurrences.  An “occurrence” is defined as “an accident, including 
injurious exposure to conditions, which results during the policy period in 
bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the 
standpoint of the insured.”84 A typical CGL policy states that the bodily 
injury or property damage must be caused by an occurrence that takes place 
during the policy period.85 In either sport, it is undisputed that the affected 
NFL and NHL players sustained bodily injuries, which are defined as 
“bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by a person.”86 The bodily 
injuries at issue are the neurodegenerative disorders and diseases that the 
plaintiffs sustained due, at least in part, to repeated head traumas while 
playing NFL football and NHL hockey. 
In cases such as these, where harm accrued over a long period of 
time, coverage will turn on the presence of a trigger.  However, the 
standard CGL policy does not clearly specify which trigger theory is 
applicable.  This is the difficulty with latent harms, or “harms that may not 
                                                                                                                 
81 ROSSI & MESE, supra note 59, at 109. 
82 See id. 
83 See BAKER, supra note 59, at 375. 
84 ROSSI & MESE, supra note 59, at 110. 
85 See BAKER, supra note 59, at 358. 
86 Id. at 369. 
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develop into symptomatic diseases for significant periods of time.”87 With 
latent harms, a player is injured, but the injury does not immediately 
manifest itself.  In these instances, a player is arguably injured once they 
receive a concussion, as their brain may begin to develop a 
neurodegenerative disease, but these neurodegenerative diseases do not 
manifest themselves for many years.  Thus, in cases presenting latent 
harms, a court must decide what type of trigger theory to impose. 
 
B. TRIGGER THEORIES 
Courts typically apply one of three main trigger theories to 
determine when an insurance contract is triggered: the initial exposure 
trigger theory, the manifestation trigger theory, or the continuous trigger 
theory.  In the case of latent harms, courts are forced to consider the 
difficulty of determining the point at which an insured became injured.  
Courts were faced with similar questions in the asbestos context and 
considered the unworkability of the initial exposure and manifestation 
trigger theories and the insured’s reasonable expectations.  Inhaling 
asbestos is a type of latent harm because a person who inhales asbestos 
does not appear ill until a long period of time after exposure, when they 
begin to exhibit symptoms.  While an injured person is not aware that they 
have been exposed to asbestos, they are still ill from the moment of their 
initial exposure to the asbestos through the point in time when they exhibit 
signs of diseases such as mesothelioma. 
Consequently, in dealing with asbestos cases, these courts 
employed a continuous trigger theory, finding that the manifestation trigger 
theory and the initial exposure trigger theory, which both utilize a discrete 
moment to trigger insurance policies, were too difficult to apply due to 
issues of proof regarding the timing of the injuries.  While both the 
manifestation and initial exposure trigger theories were implemented in 
earlier asbestos cases, more recent cases have applied a trigger theory more 
akin to the continuous trigger theory.88 
                                                                                                                 
87 Note, Latent Harms and Risk-Based Damages, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1505, 
1506 (1998). 
88 See, e.g., J.H. Fr. Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 506 
(Pa. 1993); AC & S, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968, 973 (3d Cir. 
1985); Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1046-47 (D.C. Cir. 
1981). 
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If the NFL and NHL concussion cases proceed to trial, one of the 
most difficult insurance coverage issues will be determining when the 
players’ injuries actually occurred.  Some of the plaintiffs’ neurological 
injuries may have begun before they started playing professional football or 
professional hockey.89 There is no feasible way to differentiate which 
injuries were exacerbated by playing in the NHL or NFL from those which 
occurred for the first time while playing in the NHL or NFL.  Accordingly, 
it would be nearly impossible to use either an initial exposure theory or a 
manifestation theory to trigger the insurance policies. 
Additionally, neither of these theories would protect the reasonable 
expectations of the insured, the NHL.  “Under the ‘doctrine of reasonable 
expectations,’ an insured is entitled to all the coverage he may reasonably 
expect to be provided according to the terms of the policy.”90 Only “an 
unequivocally conspicuous, plain and clear manifestation of the [insurer’s] 
intent to exclude coverage will defeat that expectation.”91 In asbestos cases, 
courts recognized that attempting to confine an injury in cases of latent 
harm to one discrete moment would undercut the purpose of the insured’s 
policy and ignore the reasonable expectations of the insured.92 This is due 
to the fact that insureds purchase policies so that they can be covered for 
injuries that occur during the policy period.  This expectation of coverage is 
not altered in instances of latent harm where injuries do not occur at finite 
moments.  Thus, if either an initial exposure theory, which covers the 
injury if the insured is exposed to the cause during the policy period, or a 
manifestation theory, which covers the injury if it manifests itself during 
the policy period, is utilized, the insurer would be excused from covering 
the vast majority of the latent harm. 
 
                                                                                                                 
89 Stuart Dean, Concussion: A Word Not Easily Defined and Why that Spells 
Trouble for Football, NFL CONCUSSION LITIG. (Oct. 19, 2012), 
http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/?p=1200. 
90 Ky. Ass'n of Counties All Lines Fund Trust v. McClendon, 157 S.W.3d 626, 
634 (Ky. 2005). The reasonable expectations doctrine “calls for an ascertainment 
of the insured's expectations, followed by a necessarily subjective determination of 
whether that expectation is reasonable.”  2 Couch on Ins. § 22:11. 
91 McClendon, 157 S.W.3d at 634. 
92 See Keene, 667 F.2d at 1045. 
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1. Initial Exposure Trigger Theory 
 
The initial exposure trigger theory utilizes the date when the 
insured was first exposed to the harm that caused them to have a bodily 
injury to trigger an insurance policy.93 The Sixth Circuit implemented this 
exposure theory in a 1980 asbestos case due to its conclusion that bodily 
injury from asbestos began with the first exposure to and inhalation of 
asbestos.94 While the injury of neurodegenerative diseases can and often 
does begin with the initial exposure to MTBIs, it would be difficult to 
pinpoint a precise time as the “initial exposure” because if players did not 
exhibit symptoms of a concussion, no official diagnostic medical test was 
conducted when a player was hit.95 Additionally, since there are numerous 
symptoms of concussions,96 and these symptoms can be subtle, concussions 
are often misdiagnosed or entirely undiagnosed.97 
In view of these problems of proof, there are two major difficulties 
in ascertaining the timing of a player’s injury.  First, it would be extremely 
difficult to determine when players received their first concussion or any 
concussion at all, especially in the case of veteran players who played at a 
time when even less was known about concussions.  Second, it would be 
nearly impossible to conclude that a player who sustained a concussion was 
in the early stages of developing a neurodegenerative disorder.  In fact, all 
of the hockey and football players who died or committed suicide and were 
found to be suffering from CTE were not diagnosed until death because, at 
                                                                                                                 
93 ROSSI & MESE, supra note 59, at 116. 
94 Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1218 (6th 
Cir. 1980). 
95 See Ira R. Casson et al., Concussion in the National Football League: An 
Overview for Neurologists, 26 NEUROLOGIC CLINICS 217, 217 (2008); Dan Rosen, 
New concussion protocol goes into effect tonight, NHL.COM (Mar. 16, 2011), 
http://www.nhl.com/ice/news.htm?id=556289 (discussing NHL practices prior to 
protocol change in 2011 for concussion testing after injury). 
96 Symptoms are either (1) somatic, including headaches, dizziness, balance 
problems, and nausea, (2) cognitive, including memory, concentration and 
processing speed problems, or (3) affective including anxiety and depression.  
Suzanne Leclerc et al., Recommendations for Grading of Concussion in Athletes, 
31 SPORTS MED. 629, 634 (2001).  
97 See Collins, supra note 13, at 1.   
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the time of this writing, CTE can only be diagnosed post mortem.98 Due to 
this inability to determine the “initial exposure,” an initial exposure trigger 
theory is not well suited to concussion litigation. 
Additionally, the initial exposure trigger theory does not comport 
with the insured’s reasonable expectations.  In Keene, the court analyzed 
the appropriate trigger of coverage for the latent harm of asbestos.99 The 
court noted that if exposure was deemed to be a discrete injury that 
triggered coverage, 
 
[T]he subsequent development of a disease would be 
characterized best as a consequence of the injury.  Future 
stages of development would not constitute new injuries 
and therefore would not trigger additional coverage.  
Under that interpretation, a manufacturer who bought a 
comprehensive general liability policy would not bear the 
risk of liability for diseases that occurred due to exposure 
during a covered period.  It would, however, bear the risk 
of liability for diseases that manifest themselves during the 
covered period, but that occur because of exposure at a 
time when the manufacturer held no insurance.  As a result, 
the manufacturer's purchase of insurance would not 
constitute a purchase of certainty with respect to liability 
for asbestos-related diseases.  The insured would remain 
uncertain as to future liability for injuries whose 
development began prior to the purchase of insurance . . . 
such an exclusion is inconsistent with [the insured’s] 
reasonable expectations when it purchased the policies.100 
 
This same analysis is applicable in this latent harm context.  Insureds 
purchase insurance to obtain certainty that they will be covered for liability.  
Practically speaking, however, the insurers who issued policies to the 
League when its players were first exposed to MTBIs are different from the 
insurers who insured it decades later when the players’ injuries manifested 
themselves as neurological disorders.  Thus, the problem with using an 
                                                                                                                 
98 See Gary W. Small et al., PET Scanning of Brain Tau in Retired National 
Football League Players: Preliminary Findings, 21 AM. J. GERIATRIC. 
PSYCHIATRY 138, 139 (2013). 
99 Keene, 667 F.2d at 1042. 
100 Id. at 1044. 
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initial exposure theory in this context is that an insured, here the League, 
reasonably expects that if it were liable for damages, such as now when it is 
being sued by past players, that it would be covered.  However, the League 
would not be covered or would be covered for only a fraction of the time 
because the players’ injuries had been developing for years after the initial 
exposure. 
Due to the latency of the injuries, however, the analysis for 
determining the trigger of coverage cannot commence until the point of 
manifestation.  Therefore, precisely when the League would expect 
players’ injuries to be covered by the League’s insurance policies, when the 
injuries became apparent, the League would not be covered.  Because this 
would not conform with the NHL’s reasonable expectations, the initial 
exposure trigger theory should not be applied to this litigation. 
 
2. Manifestation Trigger Theory 
 
Under the manifestation trigger theory, insurance coverage is 
triggered when the damage or injury manifests itself or becomes 
apparent.101 In a 1982 asbestos case, the First Circuit adopted a 
manifestation theory on grounds that an injury is not diagnosed or felt until 
it becomes evident.102 
Over time, however, the limitations of the manifestation trigger 
theory have become apparent.  A manifestation trigger theory would be 
exceptionally difficult to implement in the concussion context.  In these 
concussion cases it is difficult to pinpoint at what time the players’ 
neurodegenerative diseases became apparent.  For instance, was it when a 
player obtained a concussion and felt dizzy, when a player could not 
remember the name of his children, or somewhere in between these two 
moments?  In this type of litigation, where thousands of players’ careers are 
involved, making the determination of when players’ injuries manifested 
would be unworkable.  In fact, “[c]ourts in recent years have been moving 
away from the manifestation trigger because of the difficulty in 
determining what constitutes manifestation of an injury concluding that this 
trigger theory is ‘inherently unworkable.’”103 
                                                                                                                 
101 ROSSI & MESE, supra note 59, at 112. 
102 See Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 19 (1st 
Cir. 1982). 
103 Gwen M. Rogers, Medical Monitoring, Trigger of Coverage Analysis, and 
the Duty to Defend, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 869, 890-91 (2005). 
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Additionally, limiting the trigger to the one finite moment of 
manifestation does not fully protect the reasonable expectations of the 
insured.  If manifestation was the sole trigger of coverage, then the 
insurance companies would only bear a fraction of the insured’s total 
liability due to the fact that harm was occurring long before 
manifestation.104 That result would “undermine the function of the 
insurance policies” because when an insured purchases policies, the insured 
could reasonably expect to be free of the risk of being liable for injuries 
that “it could not have been aware prior to its purchase of insurance.”105 If 
the disease manifested soon after a player sustained a MTBI, these losses 
would be covered and the insurer would compensate the insured.  However, 
in the case of neurodegenerative diseases that are caused by earlier 
concussions, insurers would not be liable due to the fact that a long period 
of time exists between exposure and manifestation.106 
Therefore, “to accept the argument that only manifestation triggers 
coverage — and allow insurers to terminate coverage prior to the 
manifestation of many cases of disease — would deprive [the insured] of 
the protection it purchased when it entered into the insurance contracts.”107 
In the latent harm context, the insured purchased a policy believing an 
injury that occurred during the policy period would be covered and not 
expecting that only injuries that occurred and manifested themselves during 
the policy period would be covered.  As one court explained in the asbestos 
context: 
 
The fact that a doctor would characterize cellular damage 
as a discrete injury does not necessarily imply that the 
damage is an ‘injury’ for the purpose of construing the 
policies.  At the same time, the fact that an ordinary person 
would characterize a fully developed disease as an ‘injury’ 
does not necessarily imply that the manifestation of the 
disease is the point of ‘injury’ for purposes of construing 
the policies.108 
 
                                                                                                                 
104 See Keene, 667 F.2d at 1045-46. 
105 Id. at 1046. 
106 See id. 
107 Id. 
108 Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 984 (N.J. 1994). 
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This same logic applies in the concussion context: while a doctor may 
consider a concussion a discrete injury, that does not necessarily imply that 
the damage of a concussion is an “injury” for purposes of construing an 
insurance policy.  At the same time, the fact that an ordinary person would 
characterize a fully developed neurological disease as an “injury” does not 
necessarily imply that the manifestation of the disease is the point of 
“injury” for purposes of construing the policies. 
In the context of concussion litigation, like “the context of 
asbestos-related disease[s], the term[] ‘bodily injury,’ . . . standing alone, 
simply lack[s] the precision necessary to identify a point in the 
development of a disease at which coverage is triggered.”109 Due to the fact 
that the general terms of an insurance policy in the latent harm context lack 
precision, courts are left to rely on the practicality of implementing a 
trigger theory and determining if that theory comports with the reasonable 
expectations of the insured.  In this context, utilizing the manifestation 
theory would prove to be unworkable due to the difficulty in ascertaining 
when the injury is manifested.  In order to determine the trigger in the NHL 
litigation, courts must ask whether the players suffered MTBIs while they 
were playing in the NHL and if the head traumas that occurred during their 
professional careers caused the neurological damage complained of, as 
opposed to other head impacts the players sustained in earlier or later time 
periods.  At first glance, this may seem simple to ascertain.  However, these 
players have been playing competitive hockey for years, throughout 
childhood into middle school and high school and through college all prior 
to entering the NHL.  Consequently, both the initial exposure theory and 
the manifestation theories are unworkable. 
 
3. Continuous Trigger Theory 
 
More recent CGL policies define an occurrence as “an accident, 
including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same 
general harmful conditions.”110 Policies employing this “occurrence” 
definition embrace a continuous trigger theory, which entails providing 
coverage from the date of the initial exposure to the date when the injury 
manifests itself.111 
                                                                                                                 
109 Keene, 667 F.2d at 1043. 
110 BAKER, supra note 59, at 371 (emphasis added). 
111 See ROSSI & MESE, supra note 59, at 118. 
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This theory was formulated because courts concluded that an 
insured should not be without coverage when they reasonably expected that 
they would be covered.112 In the asbestos context, the continuous trigger 
theory has gained widespread acceptance.113 In fact, in Keene, even when 
the insurance policy at issue did not utilize continuous trigger language, the 
D.C. Circuit found that while 
 
The policy language [did] not direct [it] unambiguously to 
either the ‘exposure’ or ‘manifestation’ interpretation, [i]n 
the context of asbestos-related disease[s], the terms ‘bodily 
injury,’ ‘sickness’ and ‘disease,’ standing alone, simply 
lack the precision necessary to identify a point in the 
development of a disease at which coverage is triggered . . 
. .  In interpreting a contract, a term’s ordinary definition 
should be given weight, but the definition is only useful 
when viewed in the context of the contract as a whole.114 
 
Thus, courts in the asbestos context now have guidance from language in 
insurance policies that use the term “continuous,” and when there is no 
such language, courts examine the context of the contract as a whole.  In 
other words, while newer insurance policies, which utilize continuous 
language in defining an occurrence, provide clearer guidance that a 
continuous trigger theory is appropriate, under older policies the NHL can 
still rely on its reasonable expectations because the term “injury” does not 
clearly guide courts to adopt either a manifestation or initial exposure 
trigger theory. 
Another reason courts utilize the continuous trigger theory in the 
asbestos context is that it is supported by medical research.  Medical 
research has revealed “that bodily injury occurs during the exposure period 
. . . [and] it continues to occur past the point of manifestation . . . until the 
                                                                                                                 
112 See Keene, 667 F.2d at 1044. 
113 Rogers, supra note 103 (citing Robert D. Fram, End Game: Trigger of 
Coverage in the Third Decade of CGL Latent Injury Litigation, 454 PRACTISING 
L. INST. 9, 15 (1993); Keene, 667 F.2d at 1047; Skinner Corp. v. Fireman's Fund 
Ins. Co., No. C95-995WD, 1996 WL 376657, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 3, 1996); 
Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 703 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Owens-Illinois, Inc., 650 A.2d at 995; Owens-Corning 
Fiberglas Corp. v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co., 660 N.E.2d 770, 792 (Ohio Misc. 
1995); J.H. France Refractories Co., 626 A.2d at 506-07). 
114 Keene, 667 F.2d at 1043. 
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claimant's death.”115 Asbestos inhalation is a latent harm under the same 
rationale that concussions are a latent harm — a person who breathes in 
asbestos but does not become ill for a long period of time is similar to the 
plaintiffs in this litigation who were exposed to MTBIs and were thus in the 
preliminary stages of neurological disease, but did not know they were 
injured until symptoms of neurological damage manifested at a much later 
time.  Thus, in both cases, a continuous trigger theory provides the greatest 
possible redress for the victims and for the League.116 
 Moreover, a continuous trigger better suits the NHL concussion 
litigation because it best addresses the problems of proof, which make the 
manifestation and exposure theories unworkable.  Again, it is nearly 
impossible to determine when someone is injured due to the latent nature of 
this harm.  These proof problems and the inability of both the manifestation 
and initial exposure trigger theories to fully cover the plaintiffs’ reasonable 
expectations make the continuous trigger theory the best approach for 
deciding when the NHL’s insurance policies are triggered. 
While it would be more beneficial for insurers to control what 
trigger theory courts implement by adding language into their policies, a 
continuous trigger theory does have one advantage for insurers.  Courts 
have determined that the term “occurrence” suggests that the policy was 
intended to cover more than a single accident, and instead, covers 
continuous or repeated exposure to the same general harm.117 Typically, 
insurance policies will contain a provision that explains that continuous 
exposure to the same harm is one occurrence so that the insurer will only 
be liable for their policy limits for a single occurrence.118 This approach 
benefits the insurers because consolidating all the individual injuries as one 
“occurrence” would, to some extent, diminish the insurers’ liability to its 
insured.  This single occurrence policy limit factor, however, would be a 
silver lining to a very dark cloud, as judges will likely invoke the 
continuous trigger theory as the most workable standard limiting insurers’ 
ability to avoid coverage. 
Insurers in the NHL and other contact sports are likely to take 
additional steps in the near future to protect themselves so that they are not 
liable for the entire span of a player’s career when a player develops a 
                                                                                                                 
115 Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 702. 
116 See ROSSI & MESE, supra note 59, at 118. 
117 PATRICK J. BOLEY, THE REFERENCE HANDBOOK ON THE COMPREHENSIVE 
GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY 75-76, (Alan Rutkin & Robert Tugander eds., 2010). 
118 Id. at 76. 
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neurodegenerative disease from their contact sport career.  Insurers have a 
few options for how to protect themselves.  For instance, when insurers 
issue replacement policies for older policies that have expired, they may be 
able to change the trigger of coverage or the scope of coverage itself. 
As briefly noted above, one option would be to define the trigger of 
coverage as the first diagnosed concussion or the first diagnosis of a 
neurological disorder in their insurance policies to avoid leaving the 
question of the trigger up to a judge.  Additionally, insurers could add 
concussion exclusions into their policies to avoid covering players with 
histories of concussions.  This may result in pushback from individual 
NHL teams as well as the press and the public at large, however, if the 
NHL’s insurers turn their backs on players who have been in the League 
for a number of years.  Another option that insurers have would be to put 
pressure on the NHL to change its policies about fighting and other safety 
measures in order to insure the League for concussion-related injuries.  
This would likely reduce the number of concussions, as many of the NHL 
players who had CTE in their brains were termed the “NHL enforcers,”119 
players known for their aggressive fighting in the League.  At a minimum, 
insurers will likely expand their underwriting of concussions by asking 
more thorough and extensive questions about a player’s concussion history 
so they can properly assess and price the risk.  While insurers could take an 
even bigger step to protect themselves and stop insuring the NHL and its 
players, since the NHL, a multi-billion dollar industry,120 is a real profit 
center, it would be very difficult for insurers to walk away from it. 
 
V. EXPECTED AND/OR INTENDED INJURIES 
Aside from alleging that its insurance policies were not triggered 
due to a particular trigger theory, insurers can also argue that the League 
expected and/or intended its players’ concussions.  While the insurers could 
raise this defense to coverage, they may find it difficult to persuade a court 
that the League intended and/or expected that the players would have long-
term neurological diseases.  There is ample evidence that physical injuries 
in contact sports are expected, but courts have yet to draw a parallel 
between physical injuries, which are expected and/or intended, and 
cognitive or neurological injuries. 
 
                                                                                                                 
119 Branch, supra note 17. 
120 See Compl., supra note 9, at ¶ 78. 
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A. EXPECTED INJURIES ARE NOT “OCCURRENCES.” 
In order for an event to be covered under a CGL insurance policy, 
it must also take place by chance.121 If the policyholder has control over the 
risk, the event may not be considered an “occurrence.”122 Under the typical 
CGL policy, for “bodily injury” to be covered, it must occur during the 
policy period and cannot, prior to the policy period, be known to have 
occurred by any insured.123 Under this provision, if players knew they had 
sustained MTBIs prior to entering the NHL, the insurer may not be liable. 
The argument that the League expected and/or intended these 
injuries may be difficult to sustain, however, because not all concussions 
lead to neurodegenerative diseases.  Additionally, not all players who 
previously sustained concussions knew that they had been injured.  
Moreover, the League was unlikely to have access to information about 
players’ injuries prior to them entering the League. 
Despite these obstacles, the insurers could still allege that the 
League expected that the players might sustain long-term neurological 
injuries due to the violent nature of the game of hockey.  Under this theory, 
the insurers could argue that they do not have a duty to indemnify the 
League because CGL policies contain an exclusion for intended or 
expected injury.  This provision provides that, “‘bodily injury’ or ‘property 
damage’ expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured” is 
excluded from coverage.124 Expected injury typically requires that the 
insured “knows or reasonably anticipates” that there is a high probability 
that the insured’s conduct will cause harm.125 Therefore, the insurers may 
be able to show that the NHL had knowledge about the risks that the 
players were facing by playing professional hockey and thus knew, or at 
least reasonably anticipated, that they were more prone to suffering from 
long-term cognitive injuries. 
Additionally, the League could be liable for failing to inform its 
players of these health risks if the insurers can show that the League 
possessed information about the seriousness of MTBIs and remained silent.  
                                                                                                                 
121 JOEL R. MOSHER, THE REFERENCE HANDBOOK ON THE COMPREHENSIVE 
GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY 52 (Alan Rutkin & Robert Tugander eds., 2010).  
122 Id. at 53. 
123 See id. at 57. 
124 CHARLES PLATTO, THE REFERENCE HANDBOOK ON THE COMPREHENSIVE 
GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY 147 (Alan Rutkin & Robert Tugander eds., 2010).  
125 Id. at 151.  
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Moreover, if the League engaged in intentional misconduct by fraudulently 
concealing information, as the players allege, the League’s conduct could 
be excluded from coverage.126 
 Thus, the question of what injury the League expected or intended is 
central.  Absent evidence to the contrary, it is likely that the League 
expected that its players could sustain short-term physical injuries but not 
long-term neurological harms.  However, this distinction between the types 
of injury that players would experience may not be enough to secure 
coverage.127 The Evans test, which some courts utilize, requires that the 
insured intended its conduct and intended some kind of injury, but once 
these requirements have been met, it is “immaterial that the actual harm 
caused is of a different character or magnitude from that intended” by the 
insured.128 Under the Evans test, if the insurers proved that the League 
intended or expected that the players would be injured, it would be 
immaterial if the League intended or expected eventual neurological harm, 
and therefore these claims would not be covered under the NHL’s 
insurance policies.  Courts applying the Evans test rationalize its 
implementation by explaining that this test is consistent with both parties’ 
reasonable expectations and is aligned with public policy.129 Thus, under 
the Evans test, a court may find that the League expected or intended to act 
in a way that would result in some type of injury to the players and 
therefore its claims would be not covered by its insurance policies. 
 One notable difference about this argument in the NFL context is 
that there is no condoned physical fighting in the NFL.  As the hockey 
players’ complaint alleges: 
 
For decades, the NHL has been aware or should have been 
aware that multiple blows to the head can lead to long-term 
brain injury, including but not limited to memory loss, 
dementia, depression, and CTE and its related symptoms. 
                                                                                                                 
126 See ROSSI & MESE, supra note 59, at 109-10 (An “occurrence” must be 
accidental, resulting “in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor 
intended from the standpoint of the insured,” and thus if the insured acted 
intentionally it would not be an occurrence.).  
127 See ERIC MILLS HOLMES, 21 HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2D § 
132.2[B][2] (2002) (citing Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Evans, 814 S.W.2d 49, 
55 (Tenn. 1991)). 
128 Evans, 814 S.W.2d at 55; see also Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Henderson, 939 
P.2d 1337, 1343 (Ariz. 1997). 
129 Iowa Kemper Ins. Co. v. Stone, 269 N.W.2d 885, 887 (Minn. 1978). 
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Indeed, since the NHL has permitted bare-knuckle, on-ice 
fighting from its inception to the present, the NHL knew or 
should have known that the nearly century-old data from 
boxing was particularly relevant to professional hockey.130 
 
Boxing was one of the first sports to conduct research on the dangerous 
impacts of multiple blows to the head.131 Due to that widely known 
research, the insurers have a strong argument that the League intended 
and/or expected the players’ injuries by allowing and supporting 
fighting.132  From the prospective of the insurers, due to the fighting in the 
NHL the insurers could invoke the exclusion to avoid indemnifying the 
League.  Nevertheless, this does not mean that the League’s insurers will 
be able to avoid their duty to defend. 
 
                                                                                                                 
130 Compl., supra note 9, at ¶¶ 98, 99. 
131 See Robert A. Stern et. al., Long-term Consequences of Repetitive Brain 
Trauma: Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy, 3 PM&R S460, S461 (2011) (“[I]t 
has been known for some time that contact sports may be associated with 
neurodegenerative disease. In 1928, Martland described a symptom spectrum in 
boxers, which he termed ‘punch drink,’ that appeared to result from the repeated 
blows experience in the sport, particularly in slugging boxers who took significant 
head punishment as part of their fighting style.”). 
132 The League can also argue that pursuant to the doctrine of assumption of 
the risk that “a person who voluntarily participates in a sporting activity generally 
consents, by his or her participation, to those injury-causing events, conditions, and 
risks which are inherent in the activity.” Cotty v. Town of Southampton, 64 
A.D.3d 251, 253 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). “Inherent risks in a sport are those that 
are “known, apparent, natural, or reasonably foreseeable consequences of the 
participation.” Id. at 253-54. Some jurisdictions have limited their application of 
assumption of risk, and the doctrine’s application has become one of the most 
unsettled areas of tort law.  DAVID HORTON, Extreme Sports and Assumption of 
Risk: A Blueprint, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 599, 601 (2004).  However, even if this 
doctrine is inapplicable, this doctrine is a subset of the intended/expected injury 
doctrine, which the insurers and the League can still utilize.  Nonetheless, this note 
is focusing on the insurers arguments against the League and not the League’s 
arguments against the players. 
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VI. RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE DUTY TO DEFEND 
 Under a CGL policy, the insurer is obligated to defend and 
indemnify its insured.133 These two duties are integrated because the insurer 
will have a stronger incentive to defend fully if it will be held financially 
responsible through a duty to indemnify if it loses the case.  Courts have 
viewed the duty to defend as broader than the duty to indemnify.134 
Because an insurer’s obligation to defend is broader, an insurer may be 
“contractually bound to defend despite not ultimately being bound to 
indemnify.”135 This situation often arises when it comes to light during 
litigation that the insured is not factually or legally liable or that the 
occurrence is outside the policy’s coverage.136 Specifically, an insurer 
could be required to defend its insured throughout litigation and at the 
conclusion of trial obtain a ruling that provides that the claims are outside 
of the policy’s coverage, and thus the insurer would not be required to 
indemnify its insured. 
 
A. DUTY TO DEFEND 
The typical language establishing the insurer’s duty to defend in a 
CGL policy provides, 
 
We will have the right and duty to defend the insured 
against any “suit” seeking those damages.  However, we 
will have no duty to defend the insured against any “suit” 
seeking damages for “bodily injury” or “property damage” 
to which the insurance does not apply.  We may, at our 
discretion, investigate any occurrence and settle any claim 
or “suit” that may result . . . .137 
                                                                                                                 
133 LAURIE E. DUGONITHS, THE REFERENCE HANDBOOK ON THE 
COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY 231 (Alan Rutkin & Robert 
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137 DUGONITHS, supra note 133, at 231. 




The scope of the insurer’s duty to defend depends on the nature of the 
allegations set forth in the complaint and not on the ultimate basis of the 
liability of the insured.138 Typically, the duty to defend is determined by the 
“eight-corners” rule.139 Under the eight-corners rule, when an insured is 
sued by a third party, the insurer must determine its duty to defend from the 
terms of the policy and the pleadings of the third-party claimant.140 Most 
courts do not allow insurers to examine evidence outside the four corners 
of these two documents.141 Thus, looking exclusively at the allegations that 
the players have made against the NHL, since there is a claim for 
negligence, the insurers will likely be required to defend. 
This conclusion is also supported by the Supreme Court of 
California’s decision in Gray, in which the court held that an insurer had a 
duty to defend its insured despite the fact that the complaint stated that the 
insured intentionally caused bodily injury.142 In Gray, the court focused on 
the specific CGL policy in which the insurer made two promises: 
 
[1.] To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the 
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages 
because of bodily injury or property damage, and [2.] the 
company shall defend any suit against the insured alleging 
such bodily injury or property damage and seeking 
damages which are payable under the terms of this 
endorsement, even if any of the allegations of the suit are 
groundless, false, or fraudulent.143 
 
The Court in Gray concluded that without further clarification, the insured 
would reasonably expect that the insurer would defend him against lawsuits 
seeking damages for bodily injury, whatever the alleged cause of the injury, 
whether intentional or inadvertent.144  
                                                                                                                 
138 Id. at 234-35. 
139 Id. at 236. 
140 Id. 
141 See GuideOne Elite Ins. Co. v. Fielder Rd. Baptist Church, 197 S.W.3d 
305, 307 (Tex. 2006). 
142 Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 175, 179 (Cal. 1966). 
143 Id. at 173. 
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 A minority of jurisdictions permit insurers to consider evidence 
outside of the complaint and the policy in evaluating the duty to defend.145 
However, even in those jurisdictions, examining outside information would 
likely prove insufficient in persuading a court to determine that the insurers 
do not have a duty to defend the League. 
 
B. INSURERS’ DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 
Theoretically, the insurer is not forced to defend the insured if the 
insurer believes the claims alleged against it would not be covered under 
the insured’s policy.  One option the insurer possesses is to deny its duty to 
defend.  If the insurers refused to defend in the case at bar, the NHL would 
have two options.  First, it could settle the cases to avoid the risk of 
potentially losing an exorbitant amount of money at trial.  Second, the NHL 
could litigate the case.  In the first hypothetical situation, if any of the 
insurers refused to defend the NHL and a judgment was rendered against 
the NHL, the insurer would no longer have the ability to re-litigate any 
factual issues.146 Moreover, if the NHL could demonstrate that it made a 
reasonable settlement in good faith and its insurers wrongfully refused to 
defend it, then the insurers would be required to compensate the League for 
that settlement.147 In the second scenario, if the League could prove that the 
insurers wrongfully refused to defend it, the insurer would also be required 
to compensate the League for the verdict and the cost of litigation.148  
 Since these methods of refusing to defend are precarious, insurers 
typically file a motion for declaratory judgment in which they ask a court to 
determine whether they have a duty to defend.  Nevertheless, courts 
typically will not grant declaratory relief if the issues giving rise to the 
conflict between the insured and insurer are entangled with the issues that 
will ultimately determine whether the insurer is liable to the 
                                                                                                                 
outside information would likely prove insufficient in persuading a court to 
determine that the insurers do not have a duty to defend the League. 
145 DUGONITHS, supra note 133, at 241. 
146 Gallagher v. Dupont, 918 So.2d 342, 348 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).  
147 Id. 
148 Adam M. Smith & Caroline L. Crichton, Bad Faith under a Commercial 
General Liability Policy, in THE REFERENCE HANDBOOK ON THE COMPREHENSIVE 
GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY 311, 317 (Alan Rutkin & Robert Tugander eds., 
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policyholder.149 Just as many insurers filed motions for declaratory 
judgment in the NFL concussion litigation, it is likely that the NHL’s 
insurers and the hockey teams’ individual insurers will file similar motions 
seeking to avoid defending and/or indemnifying the League or the teams. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 It is likely that in the near future other contact sport organizations 
will follow the lead of the NFL and NHL players, as many participants in 
other popular American sports such as wrestling, rugby, soccer, and 
lacrosse “all risk exposure to brain injur[ies] that range from asymptomatic 
subconcussive blows to symptomatic concussion[s] to more moderate or 
severe traumatic brain injur[ies].”150 
 Regardless of what contact sport organizations engage in concussion 
litigation, however, all of the insureds will likely turn to their insurers to 
both defend and indemnify them.  While it will behoove insurers insuring 
contact sport organizations that have yet to bring this type of concussion 
litigation to be proactive in amending their policies, insurers in the current 
NHL concussion litigation will not necessarily be required to indemnify the 
League.  One of the main reasons the League may be able to avoid 
indemnification is due to the fighting that takes place in the League.  
Insurers may be successful in demonstrating that the League intended 
and/or expected that its players were at a heightened risk to suffer from 
neurodegenerative diseases and be able to avoid indemnifying the League 
against the players since bare-knuckle fighting has been part of the sport 
since its inception.151 If the League’s insurers were able to avoid 
indemnification and the League was required to pay for this litigation by 
itself, it could conceivably self-insure due to its vast revenues.152 
Nonetheless, depending on how large of an award the players received, this 
                                                                                                                 
149 See Gendron v. Delpozzo, No. 04-0907, 04-0999, 2005-0027, 2007 WL 
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litigation could be very problematic for the League as the game of hockey 
could become less profitable after this litigation if it eliminates or largely 
limits the fighting that fans have come to expect.   
 Conversely, if the insurers are required to indemnify the League, it 
will be costly for the insurers, especially in the event that a continuous 
trigger theory is used, which will trigger more policies.  Despite potentially 
costing insurers more, courts should implement this trigger theory, as it is 
the most appropriate trigger for these cases presenting latent harm as it best 
comports with the League’s reasonable expectations and addresses the 
difficulty of ascertaining the timing of the players’ injuries.  In the future, 
contact sport insurers, including the NFL’s and NHL’s insurers, who wish 
to avoid a court implementing a continuous trigger may modify their 
policies to identify a specific trigger in relation to concussions or include 
additional language to clearly limit their liability to a discrete moment.     
 While the League’s insurers may avoid indemnifying it, since the 
underlying complaint alleges negligence and other claims that could be 
covered by the insurance policies, it appears likely that the League’s 
insurers will be required to defend it.  But it is also likely that both the 
NHL’s and NFL’s concussion cases will settle. 
 Although it is likely that both of these concussion cases may fail to 
ever reach trial, these two lawsuits will have an undeniable impact reaching 
past insurance law and touching on all contact sports in the United States.  
Parents now consider football and hockey more dangerous for their 
children than ever before, and players now realize that there are serious 
long-term risks that could affect their quality of life associated with playing 
these sports.  Thus, while this litigation will greatly affect insurers and their 
relationship with contact sport organizations, it will also change two of the 
most popular American sports for generations to come. 
